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Introduction 
This paper empirically measures the effect of war on some Italian and US financial variables 
using the heteroskedasticity based estimation technique proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2003). 
This work refers to the days of the two wars with Iraq, and considers the effects of these wars in 
Italy and the effect of the Iraq war of 1990 in US as well. This study has been motivated by 
“The effect of war risk in US” where Rigobon and Sack (2005) study the effects of the Iraq war 
of 2003 analysing its effects in US.  
The aims of this work are twofold. The first is to verify whether the two Iraq wars has had 
similar effects. We analyse whether the war has had different results in the two periods and we 
test the robustness of Rigobon and Sack’s methodology as well. Second, we measure the effect 
of war on other variables beyond those considered by Rigobon and Sack. 
This approach is innovative because of the difficulty of identifying the effect of war, which 
is  a  variable  that  is  not  measurable,  on  some  variables.  If  the  risk  of  war  was  a  variable 
observable and measurable, then we could have simply used an OLS to estimate its effects on 
the economy. 
The advantage  of  the heteroskedasticity-based  approach we  are  going to  apply  is  that  it 
allows to identify the impact of war risk without having to quantify or even sign the risk itself. 
Implementing this estimator only requires to identify two sets of days: one in which the variance 
of war related news was high and one in which the variance of war related news was low. These 
days have been identified in accordance to the events and news which have been considered as 
having a significant effect for the war. Rigobon and Sack’ estimation technique indicates that 
determining this set of days is sufficient to capture the effects of the level of war risk factor on 
various asset prices. Liuc Papers n. 171, giugno 2005 
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This feature of the methodology is appealing because it is much easier to determine when 
war related news took place, than to quantify the news itself.  
In particular, identification of the parameters is obtained by the shift in the variance of the 
variables  on  these  days;  this  is  sufficient  to  capture  the  effect  of  war  on  the  variables 
themselves. 
When we refer to the Iraq war of 2003, the findings of this study suggest that the risk of war 
has a significant role in explaining the behaviour of Italian financial variables. The financial 
variables  considered  are  the  equity  price  index,  the  average  yield  of  a  10  and  5  years 
government bond, the 30 years, 10 years and 2 years government bond price index, the gold 
price, the nominal euro effective exchange rate and the interbank rate at one month.  
As the results indicate, increases in the risk of war produce significant effects. The increase 
in  the  risk  of  war  caused  a  significant  increase  in  the  government  bond  price  index  at  all 
maturities, a significant decline in the equity price index and in the average yield of the bonds, 
and finally a depreciation of the dollar.  
These results show the importance that an event such as the war in Iraq has had in explaining 
the movement and behaviour of the financial variables of that period. The results we find are in 
line  with  those  found  by  Rigobon  and  Sack  (2005)  for  US.  This  finding  shows  the  equal 
response of the behaviour of different countries to the war; it can also be interpreted as a proof 
of robustness of Rigobon and Sack’s findings. 
When we refer to the Iraq war of 1990, instead, the results suggest that the risk of war did 
not affect the behaviour of the financial variables in both Italy and US. The financial variables 
considered, because of the inferior number of data available, are only the equity price index, the 
2 years government bond price index, the exchange rate and the interbank rate at one month for 
Italy;  the  equity  price  index,  the  10  years  and  2  years  government  bond  price  index,  the 
exchange rate and the interbank rate at one month for US. 
Different from previous findings, here none of these variables reacted in a significant way to 
the war in Iraq. 
The structure of the war proceeds as follows. We first describe the methodology applied, 
underlying its main advantages. We then apply it to my data and finally we present the results 
followed by the conclusion. 
The Heteroskedasticity Based Estimation 
Before showing the results, we briefly summarise the most important features belonging to 
the heteroskedasticity-based technique. The heteroskedasticity based approach, which has been E. Corallo, The effect of the war risk: a comparison of the consequences of the two Iraq wars on some financial … 
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suggested by Rigobon and Sack and applied by the authors in many analysis (2003, 2004, 2005) 
relies on the heteroskedasticity in the data in order to identify the parameters.  
This identification approach assumes that the shift in the second moment of the financial 
variables during particular days is sufficient to explain the behaviour of these variables on those 
days. In particular, the methodology relies on the change in the covariance of the financial 
variables (we consider two of them at a time) on the days of war news, as it is plausible that 
during these days these variables are more volatile due to their responses to the war news.  
We suppose to be able to identify a period of time in which the variance of these variables 
was higher than at other times. We only need to identify two sub samples, one in which the risk 
of war is elevated, “war days”, and one in which the risk of war is low, “non war days”. This 
assumption implies that the “importance” of the risk of war increases in the first sub sample; in 
this set of days the variance of this shock is elevated.  
For the set of “war days” we choose the same period studied by Rigobon and Sack (2005) for 
the Iraq war of 2003; we select an other set of days for the Iraq war of 1990. These periods 
include all days in which events regarding the war in Iraq appeared on the newspaper. The “non 
war” days is the set of days immediately surrounding (preceding or following) the days included 
in the “war days” sample. 
Thus, we consider two sets of days: the “war” days and the “non war” days and we assume 
that only the variance of the war risk factor changes during the “war” days. Of course, other 
factors can be present in the analysis, but with the same intensity throughout the all period 
considered.  
We could have tested the effect of the war on the change in the financial variable resolving 
the problem due to the fact that the variable is not measurable with an OLS of the change of the 
financial variables on a dummy variable present on those days.  But this methodology implies 
some problems.  First, there  are  other  factors which  possibly  influence  continually and in a 
significant  way  the  financial  variables.  Then,  as  shown  in  Rigobon  and  Sack,  the  average 
change of the financial variables does not differ throughout the two periods. One reason of this 
is that the “war days” selects some days associated with increases in the risk of war, other days 
associated with decreases of this risk and lastly some days for which it is difficult to understand 
the sign of the news.  
The approach we here apply is based on the variance of the variables which, because of the 
greater intensity of war related news on “war days”, has been proven to increase sharply on 
those days. This behavior is explained by the greater intensity of war related news on those 
days. Liuc Papers n. 171, giugno 2005 
 
4 
Thus, we assume that the changes in the two financial variables that we have considered can 















































Considering two financial variables at a time, we indicate with  1 x D the change in the first 
financial  variable  and  with  2 x D the  change  in  the  second  financial  variable.  These  are 
determined by a set of common factors  [ ]
1
2 1 ,... ,z z z = which include news regarding the risk of 
war, and other macroeconomic events and a set of idiosyncratic shocks  [ ]
1
2 1,h h h = . We call 
1 z  the effect of the risk of war. 
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where, indicating with  1 z  the risk of war, the first column represents the effect of war risk on 
the two financial variables. In particular,  11 d  is the effect of war on the first financial variable. 
Because  1 z  is unobservable, we can identify the model only up to a normalization. For this 
reason, we impose the impact on the first variable to be one.  
21 d  is what we are looking for; it represents the effect of the risk of war on the second 
financial variable. 
As we have already reminded, there are two difficulties, which arise in estimating a model 
like  that  in  equation  (2).  First,  not  all  the  variables  are  observable  and  measurable.  If  the E. Corallo, The effect of the war risk: a comparison of the consequences of the two Iraq wars on some financial … 
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common factors were all observable then equation (2) could simply be estimated using an OLS 
regression.  Second,  many  of  these  unobservable  factors  can  influence  the  behaviour  of  the 
variables  in  a  manner  that  makes  it  difficult  to  recover  the  impact  of  one  of  them  on  the 
variables themselves. 
The approach used here allows to solve these problems only assuming the existence of two 
sub sample; in the “war days” sub period it is assumed that only the variance of the war risk 
factor shifts. 
The  approach  estimates  the  risk  of  war  effect  through  the  computation  of  the  variance 
covariance matrices of the two sets of days. 
We compute this variance covariance matrix for the set of “war days”, denoted as  H W , and 
for the set of “non war” days, denoted as  L W , assuming that the change in the variance of the 


























As can be seen from equation (4), the change in the variance covariance matrix among these 
















z s D DW         
where  ( ) 1
2 z s D = DW  is the shift in the variance of the war risk factor. 
From equation (4) we can derive several estimates of the parameter  21 d , as follows: 
(5) 
21 22 / ˆ DW DW = d     
(6) 




11 z s D DW = ;  ( ) 21 1
2




212 d z s D DW = . 
Two important assumptions have been made in the analysis. The first is that the variance of 
the war risk factor increases in the “war days”. The second is that the variance of other factors 
which might influence the financial variables remains unchanged in the two sub samples. A 
rejection  that  the  coefficient  estimates  d  are  the  same  could  indicate  that  one  of  these Liuc Papers n. 171, giugno 2005 
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assumptions is violated. There could be other shocks which impact on the financial variables in 
the two sets of days or there could be non-linearities which are not captured by the specification 
of the model. 
As  shown  in  Rigobon  and  Sack  (2002),  an  interesting  feature  of  the  methodology  just 
described is that it can be implemented by an instrumental variable technique. Maintaining the 
basic assumption of the methodology described, we here test the effects of the war with the help 
of instrumental variables. 
To arrive at an instrumental variable interpretation of the estimator we have to define the 
instrument to be the change in the first financial variable, 1 x D , on all war news days, and the 
negative of its change, - 1 x D , on the “ non war news days”: 
(7) 
{ } { } L t x H t x t t Î " D - È Î " D = , , , 1 , 1 1 w              
where H and L denote the set of war risk days and other days respectively. Rigobon and 
Sack  (2002)  show  that  the  estimates  of  the  impact  of  the  war  risk  factor  on  the  financial 
variables of equation (6) can be derived regressing the change in the first financial variable on 
the change in the second financial variable using both sets of days and the instrumental variable 
approach. The IV estimator is: 
(8) 
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where  the  subscripts  H  and  L  indicate  the  set  of  days  over  which  the  variance  and  the 
covariances are taken. The coefficient (9) is identical to the estimator (6). 
In the same way we can define an alternative instrument only using the second financial 
variable: 
(10) 
{ } { } L t x H t x t t Î " D - È Î " D = , , , 2 , 2 2 w    
With this instrument, the IV estimator becomes 
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which is identical to the estimator (5) above. 
Rigobon  and  Sack  (2002)  have  shown  that  both  1 w   and  2 w   are  valid  instrument  for 
estimating d under the assumptions made- that the parameters are stable and that the war risk 
factor is heteroskedastic. Their proof is reported in the appendix. 
Defining  1 w  and  2 w as valid instruments for the variables, we find the effect of the war risk 
factor regressing the change in the first financial variable on the change in the second financial 
variable. 
Application of the methodology: data and results 
To implement the methodology described, as said above, we first have to identify two sets: 
one in which the variance of war risk was elevated and one in which the variance of the war risk 
factor was low. We have used the 17 days selected by Rigobon and Sack for the Iraq war of 
2003. We have constructed an other series of days for the Iraq war of 1990. These are the days 
on which war related events appeared to be the primary cause of the behaviour and movement 
of the financial variables. In this set of days is thus plausible to assume that only the variance of 
the war risk factors shifts. The list of these days is replicated in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Using these two sub samples we apply the instrumental variable described above to some 
financial variables. The countries which have been analysed are Italy for the war of 2003 and 
also US for the war of 1990. In particular, as is evident in Table 3, the financial variables 
considered are the equity price index, the average yield of a 10 and 5 years government bond, 
the 30 years, 10 years and 2 years government bond price index, the gold price, the exchange 
rate and the interbank rate at one month for Italy. The variables studied for US are the equity 
price index, the 10 years and 2 years government bond price index, the effective exchange rate, 
and the interest rate at one month. The data are taken from Bloomberg and Datastream. 
As described above, we make the analysis considering two financial variables at a time, and 
we study the impact of a change in z1 by –0.25. Thus, the reported coefficients of Table 3 
represent movements induced by an increase in the war risk that is large enough to cause a 0.25 
basis point drop in the first financial variable that we consider in the analysis. 
Looking at the Iraq war of 2003, which is the same episode studied by Rigobon and Sack, 
the primary finding of this paper is that, in accordance to what has been studied for US, the risk Liuc Papers n. 171, giugno 2005 
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of war has a significant effect on many of Italian financial variables that we have included in the 
study.  
The results are reported in Table 3 which shows the coefficients obtained under the two 
instruments determined above and in brackets their significance levels.  
Having a general look at the findings we can at first observe that the coefficients obtained 
using both the sets of instruments are typically close to one another. This makes the structure 
that we are assuming in the analysis reliable. Thus we can think that the variance of the financial 
variables that we have analysed in the set of days we have considered, can be explained by the 
war shocks. 
In Italy the increase in the risk of war of the magnitude that we have assumed above has 
shown  a  significant  effect  on  the  financial  variables.  While  the  stock  prices  have  had  a 
significant decline, there has been a significant increase in the government bond price index at 
all maturities. This result indicates that the risk of war has led people to fear the possibility of a 
recession, with their consequent movement of preference, from risky assets, (and the following 
decline of their prices), to less risky and safer assets (with the following increase in their prices). 
The risk of war has had a significant impact on the average yields of bonds, as well. An increase 
in the risk of war caused a decline in the average yields of bonds, as their prices increased. 
As in Rigobon and Sack (2005), surprisingly, no effect has been found on gold price and on 
CPI. This is in contrast with the hypothesis made according to which people prefer safer to 
riskier assets. This is a strange result; we would have expected an increase in the price of gold 
as people during war  and conflicts  are  expected  to  prefer safer  assets  thus increasing  their 
prices. We would have also expected an increase in the CPI as the experience teaches us that 
after a war the economy experiences a period of high inflation. The reason of our results can be 
probably explained by the fact that we are here studying the immediate effects of the war, while 
the mentioned effects are likely to happen at a longer term. 
Finally,  the  risk of  war shows a  significant  effect  on  the  exchange rate: consistent  with 
Rigobon and Sack’s (2005) findings the risk of war caused a depreciation of the dollar.  
Contrary to these results, looking at the test on the Iraq war of 1990, we do not find a 
significant movement on the variables for both Italy and US. As table 3 makes clear, while the 
sign of the impact of the war on the variables is equal to that one described for the war of 2003, 
the risk of war of 1990 had a lower impact on people confidence. After the Iraq war of 2003 in 
fact people possibly feared that the conflict would have lasted longer. This made them shifting 
their preferences to safer assets with the consequent effect  on the behaviour of the financial 
variables. The Iraq war of 2003 presumably worsens the economic situation of a country which 
was already facing a period of uncertainty. This is probably the reason of the strong response of E. Corallo, The effect of the war risk: a comparison of the consequences of the two Iraq wars on some financial … 
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the financial variables to the war. The Iraq war of 1990, instead, was probably believed as a 
temporary situation and this is probably the explanation of the fact that people did not change 
their preferences and the financial variables did not move as a consequence of the conflict. 
Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that the risk of war has had significant effects on some Italian 
financial variables when we consider the Iraq war of 2003; no result has been found in both 
Italy and US, when we refer to the Iraq war of 1990. 
This analysis has been conducted through the heteroskedasticity based estimation approach. 
The basis of this analysis has been to divide the period of study into two set of days, one in 
which the heteroskedasticity of the war news has been elevated and one in which it has been 
low. The set of “war days” includes days in which there has been important news connected 
with the war. The “non war days” are days proceeding or postponing the “war days”.  
When  we  refer  to  the  Iraq  war  of  2003,  the  results  suggest  that  the  risk  of  war  has  a 
significant role in explaining the behaviour of the Italian financial variables. 
The increase in the risk of war caused a significant increase in the government bond price 
index at all maturities, a significant decline in the equity price index and in the average yield of 
the bonds, and finally a depreciation of the dollar. For contrast there does not seem to be a 
significant effect of the war risk on the gold price. 
Contrary to these results, looking at the test on the Iraq war of 1990, in both Italy and US, we 
do not find any significant movement on the variables. This suggests that the war was probably 
understood by the countries as a temporary situation; this feeling was responsible of the fact that 
none of the analysed variables reacted in a significant way to the war. 




Bohl T. Martin. `“Do central Banks React to the Stock Market? The Case of the Bundesbank' ' . 
European  University  Viadrina,  Frankfurt  (Oder)  -  Department  of  Economics  ,  Wilfrid 
Laurier University - School of Business & Economics and European Central Bank, (July, 
2003). 
Evans D. Martin, Lyons K. Richard. ``How is macro news transmitted to exchange rates?' ' . 
NBER n° 9433. (January 2003). 
Rigobon Roberto “A Simple Test for Stability of linear models under heteroskedasticity, omitted 
variables  and  endogenous  variable  problem' ' .  Available  at: 
http://web.mit.edu/rigobon/www/Pdfs/slt.pdf (September 2000). 
Rigobon Roberto and Kristin Forbes. “Contagion in Latin America definitions, measurement, 
and policy implications''. NBER WP n° 7885. (September, 2000). 
Rigobon  Roberto.  “Identification  through  Heteroskedasticity''.  Review  of  Economics  and 
Statistics, Vol. 85, Issue 4 (2003). 
Rigobon  Roberto,  Sack  Brian.  “Measuring  the  Reaction  of  Monetary  Policy  to  the  Stock 
Market' ' . Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118 Issue n° 2. pp. 639-669. (2003). 
Rigobon Roberto, Brian Sack. “Spillovers across US financial markets' ' . NBER n°9640 (March, 
2003). 
Rigobon Roberto, Sack Brian. “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices' ' . Journal of 
Monetary Economics, vol.  51, issue n° 8, pp 1553- 1575 (November, 2004). 
Rigobon Roberto, Brian Sack. ``The effects of war risk on US financial markets'' . Journal of 
Banking and Finance, forthcoming (2005). 
Thorbecke Willem, Coppock Lee. ``Why good Economic news depressed stock and bond prices 
in 1996' ' . Economic Letters Vol 54, Issue 3 pp 253-257. (1997). 
West D. Kenneth,  Wong  Ka-fu, Anatolyev Stanislav. “Instrumental Variables Estimation of 
heteroskedastic  linear  models  using  all  lags  of  instruments''.  Available  at 
http://www.nes.ru/sanatoly/Papers/WWA.pdf. (October 1997). 




Dates of High Variance of War Risk - Iraq war of 2003 
 
Date  Event  War Risk 
1/9/2003  U.N inspectors report finding no chemical weapons 
Reports that N. Korea will abandon nuclear arms program if 
U.S. reaffirms non hostility agreement 
Decreased 
Decreased 
1/10/2003  N.  Korea  announces  withdrawal  from  unclear  non-
proliferation treaty 
Increased 
1/16/2003  Reports that Saddam Hussein might consider exile 
U.N. weapons inspectors find empty chemical warheads 
Decreased 
Increased                     
1/17/2003  Saddam Hussein gives speech stating that Iraq is ready for 
war 
Increased 
1/27/2003  Blix  report:  “Iraq  appears  not  to  have  come  to  a  genuine 
acceptance of the disarmament” 
Increased 
1/29/1003  President Bush gives State of Union Address 
Secretary Powell says U.S. would assist Saddam Hussein if 
he sought exile 
Unclear 
Decreased 
1/30/2003  President  Bush  comments  on  continued  lack  of  Iraq 
cooperation 
Increased 
2/5/2003  Secretary Powell makes U.N representation in effort to build 
a broad coalition 
Unclear 
2/10/2003  Reports  that  Iraq  will  unconditionally  allow  surveillance 
flights 
Decreased 
2/12/2003  Secretary Powell says impasse has reached “moment of truth” 




2/13/2003  Rumours that President Bush set deadline to attack without 
resolution 
Increased 
2/14/2003  Blix report interpreted as reducing chance of immediate war  Decreased 
3/5/2003  Secreatary Powell makes tough comments on Iraq  Increased 
3/7/2003  Reports that Bin Laden close to being captured  Decreased 
3/10/2003  Turkey rejects U.S. use of military bases  Unclear 
3/13/2003  CNN reports that Iraq might surrender before conflict begins  Decreased 
3/17/2003  President  Bush  expected  to  announce an  ultimatum  with  a 








Dates of High Variance of War Risk - Iraq war of 1990 
 
Date  Event  War Risk 
2/8/1990  The war in Iraq breaks out. Saddam Hussein’ armies invade 
the emirate 
Increased 
6/8/1990  UN Security Council decides an embargo against Iraq and the 
occupied territories 
Unclear 
8/8/1990  Iraq annexes Kuwait  Increased 
20/8/1990  Iraq announces that all citizens belonging to the “aggressive” 
countries will be held in strategic locations 
Increased 
27/8/1990  UN  Security  Council  approves to  use  violence  in  order  to 
respect the embargo 
Increased 
28/8/1990  President  Hussein  decrees  Kuwait  an  Iraqui  province. 
Moreover  Husseins  authorizes  all  foreign  women  and 
children to leave Iraq. 
Unclear 
25/9/1990  UN  Security  Council  with  the  resolution  670  decrees 
embargo against Iraq 
Increased 
6/12/1990  President  Hussein  announces  the  liberation  of  all  western 
hostages. 
Decreased 
17/1/1991  The  alarm  is  sounding  in  Baghdad  and  the  antiaircraft 
artillery opens fire in the capital 
Increased 
23/1/1991  Powel  announces  that in  one  week  12000  raids  take  place 
successfully  over  enemy  targets,  hitting  the  95%  of  Iraqui 
radars 
Decreased 
25/2/1991  Saddam gives order to his armies to withdraw to the same 
posts of the 1990s 
Decreased 













Estimated Impact of Increase in the risk of war  
a)  Italy 
 








   The Iraq war of 2003     The Iraq war of 
1990 






   
Equity Price Index   -0.2224 
(4.3267)*  









0.1148      
(-7.2382)* 
0.1139   
(-6.2306)* 




0.0615     
(-8.9307)* 
0.0567        
(-6.0152)* 




0.0147        
(-5.9973)* 






Gold Price  -0.0007      
(0.5752) 
0.1188       
(-0.2849)  
 
   
Effective 
Exchange rate 
0.0376    
(-2.3905)* 






Interbank rate  0.0528     
(-1.0655) 
0.6637       
( -1.0763) 
   
 
-T statistics in brackets 
- * means statistically significant 
- The first variable is the interest rate at one month. Thus the reported coefficients represent movements induced 
by an  increase in the war risk that is large enough to cause a 0.25 basis point drop in the interest rate  
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Estimated Impact of Increase in the risk of war 
b)  US 
 




10 years Government 





2 years Government 
















- T statistics in brackets 
- The first variable is the interest rate at one month. Thus the reported coefficients represent movements 
induced by an increase in the war risk that is large enough to cause a 0.25 basis point drop in the interest rate  
 
 




We investigate the validity of the instruments:  
a)  an  instrument,  in  order  to  be  valid,  has  to  be  correlated  with  the  regressors,  but 
uncorrelated with the residuals. 
b) an instrument is valid if the parameters of the model are stable. 
c) in order for the instrument to be valid, the assumptions on the heteorskedasticity of the 
war shocks has to be satisfied. 
From the validity of the instruments, the asymptotic properties of the estimator derive. 
a) If the variance of  t h  is constant between the war days (H) and the non-war days (L) then 
1 w  and  2 w  are all valid instruments to estimate d. 
The proof of this proposition follows: 
A  valid  instrument  needs  to  be  correlated  with  the  explanatory  variables  from  the 
regression but uncorrelated with the residuals. The reduced form of the above equations is 













































We want to estimate the war effect  1 z  on the two financial variables  1 x  and  2 x . 
Under the assumptions that only the war shocks increases throughout the subsamples: 
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and each instrument is uncorrelated with the residuals. With this aim, we show that each 
instrument is uncorrelated with each of the structural shocks, h: 
® D - D = ￿ ￿
Î Î
t
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Similar equations are obtained for the other instrument: 
® D - D = ￿ ￿
Î Î
t
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b)  If  the  parameters  of  the  model  are  unstable  then  the  instruments  are  not  valid.  This 
happens when there are non linearities in the model, or when the parameters shift in 
policy dates. One advantage of the model is that if the model is non-linear or if the 
parameter shifts, then the overidentifying assumptions is rejected. 
c) in order for the instrument to be valid, the assumptions on the heteroskedasticity of the 
stock market shocks and of the common shocks have to be satisfied. 
 
The proof of sentence b) and c) derives from proposition a). 
 